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Abstract. In order to achieve high efficiency of classification in intrusion de-
tection, a compressed model is proposed in this paper which combines horizon-
tal compression with vertical compression. OneR is utilized as horizontal com-
pression for attribute reduction, and affinity propagation is employed as vertical 
compression to select small representative exemplars from large training data. 
As to be able to computationally compress the larger volume of training data 
with scalability, MapReduce based parallelization approach is then implement-
ed and evaluated for each step of the model compression process abovemen-
tioned, on which common but efficient classification methods can be directly 
used. Experimental application study on two publicly available datasets of in-
trusion detection, KDD99 and CMDC2012, demonstrates that the classification 
using the compressed model proposed can effectively speed up the detection 
procedure at up to 184 times, most importantly at the cost of a minimal accura-
cy difference with less than 1% on average. 
Keywords: Compressed model, MapReduce, Parallelization, Classification, In-
trusion Detection. 
1. Introduction 
With the larger and larger amount of network communication data generated, the 
design of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with high efficiency has become much 
more challenging. It is very important to discover abnormal behaviors at early stage, 
therefore, compared to the traditional signature-based detection, research on anomaly 
detection has been more popular in academia, as it has the potential power to detect 
unknown attacks by kinds of heuristic learning on the historical training data.  
Anomaly detection generally includes two steps, building a model on training data 
and using the model for detection. However, training data are usually in a large scale, 
which can severely impede the detection since many detection models may need to 
scan all of them in certain cases. Intuitionally, an effective and direct way to reduce 
time cost for detection is to minimize the volume of a model that is used in the detec-
tion process, but building a systematic and scalable solution on generating such min-
imizing training data model for efficient intrusion detection is still in challenge. 
To address this problem, our work will pay attention largely to the building of data 
compression instead of the detection phase, striving to boost the detection efficiency 
based on a proposed compressed model of training data. Therefore, the solution pre-
sented in this paper is applicable for those model-based anomaly detection approach-
es, especially for the classification based system[1] because extracting the classifica-
tion model directly from the huge volume of training data instances inevitably needs 
intense computation. 
As for how to build compressed model, our proposal is made through inspecting 
into the following common natures of the training data, that is to say the motivation 
and inspiration of our works are generated from the following observations: 
a. By analyzing the attributes of the training data, we can easily find that the values of 
some attributes (features) in the whole training data only range in a small scale, 
which may have less impact on the detection accuracy. 
b. Some training instances are similar, because they are only different from each oth-
er on several attributes and the values of these attributes are slightly different, 
which may have redundancy for detection model building.  
c. For high dimensional training data, computing the similarity or some akin metric 
between each pair of instance is time-consuming. That means, for some novel but 
promising data processing algorithms such like Affinity Propagation[2], the gen-
eral computing memory would likely explode when the dimensionality of training 
data matrix increases to some large extent.   
For the purpose of effectively and efficiently handling these problems, we will pro-
pose a new framework of compressed model on training data. The model compression 
procedure mainly includes horizontal compression and vertical compression. The 
overall idea is presented in Fig. 1, where the first step is to normalize the original data 
followed by the horizontal compression and the vertical compression sequentially. 
Based on the compressed model, efficient classification can be directly built to detect 
new data without losing accuracy. 
 
Fig.1 The main idea of compressed model for data classification  
Furthermore, to computationally compress as large-scale as the training dataset 
could be, a cloud-based computing framework will be employed to parallelize the 
compression procedure, which realizes the scalability on training data compressing. 
To summarize, we mainly make the following contributions in this paper: 
a. We propose a compressed detection model, which is a compact version from the 
original training dataset with regard to reducing both feature dimension and in-
stance volume. 
b. We implement a MapReduce based parallel computing solution for the abovemen-
tioned model compression, which can compress larger scale of training data if only 
scaling up the involving distributed nodes. 
c. We finalize our compressed model-based classification approaches, and demon-
strate the performance of our method on detection efficiency and accuracy on two 
publicly available intrusion detection datasets, KDD99[3] and CDMC2012[4]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Literature works are firstly 
studied in section 2. Section 3 introduces the methodology of our parallel and scalable 
compressed model, and explains its implementation procedure in detail. Section 4 
describes the efficient classification deployments using the compressed model. Appli-
cation experiments and its performance analysis on intrusion detection are presented 
in Section 5, while concluding remark and future work are discussed in last section. 
2. Related Work 
During the past two decades, researchers in related fields have paid much attention to 
intrusion detection. Signature based detection (e.g. Snort [5]) relies on the knowledge 
of system vulnerabilities and known attack patterns, which hence is unable to detect 
unknown attacks. Correspondingly, anomaly detection is more dynamic and be able to 
detect novel attacks, which has attracted a lot of works worldwide. Generally, an 
anomaly-based intrusion detection system includes following steps, data gathering, 
data preprocessing[6], model building[7], and model-based detection[8]. Although 
some common classification methods can be well used for the model-based detection, 
the way of model building may affect the detection results directly and heavily. 
Therefore, academic research on the model-based classification approach for intrusion 
detection is one unceasing focused topic. At beginning, detection accuracy, usually 
known as detection rate(recall) and false alarm rate(false positive), is widely con-
cerned for the real-world application purpose. Recently, detection efficiency is more 
considered rather than accuracy to practical significance, especially on the potential 
abnormal behavior detection for high-speed and real-time network traffics. Neverthe-
less, both  
2.1 Efficiency Concerned Intrusion Detection 
In 1998, Lee and Stolfo [9] published a data mining approach for the intrusion detec-
tion, where they proposed a framework for the agent-based intrusion detection, and 
deployed data mining methods to extract detection rules. Afterwards many research-
ers definitely focused on the way of boosting the detection speed. For example, 
Sung[10] improved the detection speed by extracting the useful subset of attributes 
with ANN and SVM, and Srilatha[11] investigated the performance of Bayesian net-
works (BN) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) to build lightweight 
IDS. 
Actually, anomaly intrusion detection is a kind of complicated classification prob-
lem since there are usually too many attributes or features which may be redundant. 
So, attribute reduction or feature selection is the most popular method to improve 
detection efficiency by directly reducing the data attribute dimension[12]. There are 
several basic but still in-progressing ways of feature selection for anomaly intrusion 
detection. PCA is a widely used criteria to select features for intrusion detection, 
which can be usually incorporated with other soft computing models, such as neural 
networks[13], genetic algorithms[14], etc. PCA is a statistics-based method which is 
direct and effective, but it lacks much intelligence. Some novel methods are therefore 
proposed recently that employ diverse intelligent approaches to reduce features, such 
as fuzzy C means[15], mutual information definition[16], graph visualization tech-
nique[17], gradually removal method[18], etc. Although reducing attributes can obvi-
ously lower the time cost for detection, detection accuracy should also be guaranteed 
for real-world applications which will be discussed in the next subsection.  
More importantly, as to handle the massive traffic data in network intrusion detec-
tion, two aspects of effort on efficiency improvement are further studied. One is to 
sample the data as a training dataset instead of considering the full dataset, for exam-
ple the random data sampling method[19] was proposed to deal with the massive 
traffic, and the fuzzy C-means[20] was also employed for the purpose of selecting 
smaller number of training data. However, the biggest problem of sampling methods 
is that it may lose potentially useful data which are very distinguishable for detec-
tion[21]. Another important way is to parallelize the data processing procedure to 
achieve the computation improvement. With the development of the hardware, Gior-
gos firstly made efforts to improve the detection speed by applying graphics proces-
sors[22], followed by the improved works in paper [23] which focused on the scala-
bility of analyzing large data except speed acceleration. At very current, MapReduce 
based cloud computing frameworks start to be studied to build efficient intrusion 
detection systems[24,25]. Actually, a general data mining toolkit using MapReduce 
has been integrated with Weka[26], and there also developed a new toolkit on Ha-
doop, Mahout[27],where most classical data mining algorithms are all parallelized 
and distributed. All these implementations show that cloud-based parallel computing 
is a promising solution to improve the efficiency of intrusion detection. It makes us 
believe that MapReduce could also be explored in our works to parallelize and dis-
tribute each step of data computing on model compression for intrusion detection. 
2.2 Accuracy Concerned Intrusion Detection 
As discussed above, intrusion data attributes are sometimes redundant, which is one 
intrinsic reason for attribute reduction. Nevertheless, attributes may also contain false 
correlation. As to reduce the false alarm rate, alert correlation algorithms are integrat-
ed with the existing feature selection methods to automatically generate a more con-
cise feature set to improve the overall precision of intrusion detection[28,29,30]. Re-
cently, some other machine learning-based adaptive methods are also proposed to 
purify the false alarm[31,32]. Other than feature selection, clustering has been widely 
used as hybrid machine learning approach to improve the detection rate[33].   
Generally speaking, a hybrid approach for intrusion detection is involved between 
the clustering and classification models. Clustering is usually used as the first step to 
filter out unrepresentative data, while classification is used later for detection[34,35]. 
In fact, the data which cannot be clustered accurately could be regarded as noisy data 
or outliers. So, the final clustered data, also called representative data or exemplars, 
are possibly without the noisy data and could be better used to train the classifier to 
improve the detection rate[36]. As for clustering, k-means is the most popular solu-
tion for intrusion detection[35,37,38], while k-NN and SVM are two commonly ac-
cepted models for classification in this domain[35,36,38,39]. Moreover, improvement 
researches on k-NN and SVM are still continuingly active to raise the detection preci-
sion[38,40].  
As a new study, recent researches show that a novel clustering method, affinity 
propagation[2], can well be used to generate the good representative data for intrusion 
detection training[41,42]. Also, the AP clustering method is already employed to well 
apply on network stream data processing to improve the detection correctness[43]. 
Although it can drive high accuracy, the clustering performance of AP when pro-
cessing large training datasets is very frustrating. Therefore, research on paralleliza-
tion of AP is also introduced recently, for example, GPU-based parallelization of AP 
has been freshly developed to speed up the clustering[44]. However, like the tradi-
tional parallel algorithms, GPU-based approaches still challenge some intrinsic prob-
lems such as shared communication, load balancing, etc[45]. So as aforementioned, 
implementing cloud computing based AP parallelization will achieve many merits 
such as the fault-tolerance of failure nodes, the ability to scale-up large number of 
nodes on commodity hardware, etc.  
2.3 Both Concerned Intrusion Detection 
From the related works discussed above, we can find the following two key technique 
trends on intrusion detection. 
a. Clustering is very useful to find the outliers for intrusion detection[46], especially 
AP clustering is one promising method on exemplars selection for intrusion detec-
tion[41,42,43]. 
b. Cloud computing is a transparent framework to implement parallelization of data 
processing algorithms, especially MapReduce becomes a promising approach to-
wards to scalable intrusion detection system[24,25,47].  
Another observation is that most of the-state-of-art works on intrusion detection on-
ly focus on efficiency or accuracy. That means, feature selection and clustering are 
generally two independent research topics for efficiency and accuracy respectively, 
and there is few systematic and practical approach to guarantee both two.   
Therefore, our works in this paper will initially focus on the following two aspects. 
a. Propose a data compact model, named compressed model, which integrates both 
feature selection and AP clustering to be more concise and accurate. The com-
pressed model is based on the view of systematic methodology, on which some 
classification model for intrusion detection can then be efficiently built. 
b. Employ MapReduce to implement a full parallel compression framework which 
can be scalable in processing large training data. This makes the model compres-
sion both efficient and available, thus the classification-based intrusion detection 
using such compressed model is practical with high efficiency and accuracy.  
3. Parallel and Scalable Model Compression 
3.1 Using Training Data to Build Compressed Model 
In this section, we will elaborate the details of our proposed compressed model. Con-
ventionally, data collection, data analysis, model building and detection are four se-
quential steps for constructing the supervised or the semi-supervised anomaly detec-
tion system, where the model building step is our major concentration. 
 
 
Fig.2 Compressed model building with OneR as horizontal compression and AP as vertical compression 
As illustrated in Fig.2, to build a compressed model, firstly we horizontally abstract 
the useful attributes from the training data that have been normalized, saying attribute 
reduction. Then, we vertically compress the training data to further select representa-
tive ones, saying instance reduction.  
Prior to the discussion of the compressed model, we firstly introduce two datasets 
used throughout this paper. KDD99 dataset is a well-known intrusion detection evalu-
ation dataset transformed from DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset. Alt-
hough KDD99 has been criticized for various reasons, it is still a benchmark for eval-
uating performance of intrusion detection. KDD99 is collected in a military network 
environment and it contains numerous simulated connections including normal ones 
and attacks. Each of the connections in the KDD99 has already been broken down 
into 41 attributes and well labeled as normal or a specific attack type. Here we simply 
classify all the instances into two types, normal and attack. Due to the huge volume of 
KDD99 and for experimental analysis purpose, we just use randomly selected 10,000 
instances from KDD99 for training and another 90,000 instances for detection. Since 
KDD99 is an old dataset more than ten years ago which cannot identify the current 
network situation to some extent, we also use the CDMC2012 dataset in our experi-
ments
1
. The real traffic data in CDMC2012 are collected from several types of 
honeypots and a mail server over 5 different networks inside and outside of Kyoto 
University. The dataset is composed of 14 features including label information which 
indicates whether each session is attack or not. Similarly, we classify the dataset into 
two categories, normal and attack, and we use the available training data to perform 
our experiments, where 12,872 instances are used for training and another 115,848 
instances for detection. 
Note that the whole training and testing data are always made up of a lot of in-
stances. Each instance can be seen as a row, which consists of m attributes, and can be 
expressed as                                        , where    is the  -
th instance of the whole dataset   which totally contains n instances. A mapping ex-
ample of the attributes and their corresponding values in KDD99 dataset is listed in 
Table 1, and a similar mapping method is also employed in the later discussed dataset 
of CDMC2012. 
Table 1. A mapping illustration of attributes and the corresponding values for KDD99 
Basic Attributes Content Attributes Traffic Attributes 
Name Value Name Value Name Value 
Duration [0, 58329] hot [0, 101] Count [0, 511] 
protocol_type {TCP, UDP, ICMP} logged_in {0, 1} serror_rate [0.00, 1.00] 
src_bytes [0, 1379963888] root_shell {0, 1} same_srv_rate [0.00, 1.00] 
wrong_fragment [0, 3] num_root [0, 7468] dst_host_count [0, 255] 
3.1.1 Data Normalization 
 
Since the training data are made up of a large number of instances and each instance 
has several attributes, a challenge about the training data is that the values of different 
attributes are distributed on disparate scales, which may cause a bias toward certain 
attributes over others. Here we give an example: consider two vectors with 3 attrib-
utes, {(0, 1200, 5), (1, 1000, 10)}. Taking the Euclidean distance for example, the 
squared distance between vectors will be (0 - 1)
2
 + (1200 - 1000)
2
 + (5 - 10)
2
, which is 
decided heavily by the second attribute. To balance the contribution of every attribute 
in the similarity calculation, we first normalize the data to the scale of [0, 1] through 
the following formula (1). 
  [ ]  
  [ ]     [ ]
    [ ]     [ ]
 .                                              (1) 
Here   [ ] denotes the value of jth attribute of ith data instance.     [ ] is the small-
est value of attribute   among the dataset  , while     [ ] is the biggest one among 
all the data instances. 
                                                          
1
 CDMC2012 is the 3rd Cybersecurity Data Mining Competition satellited with ICONIP 2012, where a novel intrusion detec-
tion dataset is published as task 2. Note that two graduate students supervised by the first author have ever attended this competition 
and finally won the First place on task 2 with the highest detection accuracy 97.14%. You may please refer to 
http://www.csmining.org/cdmc2012/index.php?id=14 if interested. 
3.1.2 Horizontal Compression 
 
The horizontal compression, as the first step of building a compressed model, mainly 
explores the relations and correlations of the features within an instance, and extracts 
the key features. The horizontal compression is useful because in some complex clas-
sification fields the false correlative features may impede the process of detection. 
Most importantly, some features may be redundant since they may not play a role to 
distinguish one instance from others. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that excessive 
features may sharply slow down the detection. As like what we will introduce below, 
the clustering methods utilized in our experiments will calculate the distance between 
any two instances to measure their similarity. Given the high dimensionality resulting 
from numerous attributes in each instance, it is time-consuming to calculate such 
distance with all the attributes one by one. For this reason, it is meaningful to horizon-
tally compress the training data no matter in the model building phase or in the detec-
tion process. 
There are many ways to realize our horizontal compression idea. Here we choose 
OneR [48] as it is very easy to understand but with very high efficiency. We briefly 
introduce the principle of OneR by taking the protocol_type attribute of the KDD99 
dataset as an example. The illustrated process of compressing the instances horizon-
tally using OneR is shown in Fig.3. 
 
Fig. 3. An illustration of how OneR works on protocol_type of the dataset from KDD99   
OneR extracts the rules by examining the attributes one by one. The attribute in 
Fig.3 is protocol_type. First of all, OneR summarizes the quantitative relationship 
between the instance type (normal or attack) and the attribute value (TCP, UDP and 
ICMP). By traversing all the instances, it is concluded that there are two normal in-
stances and one attack instance with the TCP protocol_type in Fig.3. Then OneR 
chooses the instance type (normal or attack) with a larger frequency as the prediction 
type for a certain attribute value. For example, since two normal instances (one attack 
instance) have the TCP value, the prediction type of the TCP is ‘normal’, which 
means if the instance has the protocol_type value TCP, we predict that this instance is 
a ‘normal’ one. Finally, OneR calculates the total error of every attribute, and chooses 
the attributes with relatively lower total errors from all attributes as the representative 
ones. 
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In our applications, as a default we finally select 12 out of 34 numerical attributes 
to represent an instance in KDD99 dataset, and 10 features out of total number of 14 
after horizontal compression in CDMC2012.  
3.1.3 Vertical Compression 
 
Some training instances appear to be duplicate or similar, for example, they are prob-
ably the same packages and do the same business during a certain period of time. 
Therefore, vertical compression is called responsible for extracting a smaller set of 
representative training instances from a large scale dataset. 
For the vertical compression purpose, we here employ the latest published but 
promising clustering approach, affinity propagation[2], which is actually a corner-
stone through full of our idea. The reason to use the affinity propagation method in-
stead of other traditional clustering methods, such as k-means, is straightforward that 
the affinity propagation can cluster the data without need to predefine a threshold   of 
the expected number of clusters. Actually, in the case of the intrusion detection, we 
usually do not know how many clusters will be suitable for the training data.  
Suppose that we have the knowledge about the appropriate number of clusters be-
forehand, the classical clustering method k-means, however, will also be conducted in 
our experiments for a comparison purpose. In order to make the parameter settings in 
our experiments understandable, we would introduce and discuss the k-means and the 
affinity propagation respectively in next section.  
3.2 K-means and Affinity Propagation 
3.2.1 Brief Descriptions on Methods 
 
K-means. Given a set of instances                  , where each instance is an 
attribute vector with real values. k-means aims to partition the   instances into   sets 
                        so as to minimize the within-cluster sum of squares: 
   ∑ ∑ ‖      ‖
 
       
 
    . (2) 
Here    is the mean point in   . 
K-means firstly selects   instances randomly as cluster centroids, and then it as-
signs each of the remaining instances to the cluster whose centroid is the most similar 
to this instance. After this, k-means refreshes all the clusters and makes the mean 
vector of the entire vectors within the cluster as the new centroid. K-means iteratively 
runs the procedure until the fitness function is convergent. 
 
Affinity Propagation. Affinity Propagation (AP) clusters instances by passing mes-
sages between data points iteratively. Define                    as the instances to 
be clustered and let  (     ) denote the similarity or distance between instance   and 
instance  . Finally, we should minimize the sum of the distances between instances 
and their exemplars. The fitness function is listed below: 
       ∑  (        )
 
    . (3) 
Here      is the exemplar of instance  , and  (     ) is defined as below: 
  (     )   {
         
          
                          
 . (4) 
Here   stands for preference which is used to indicate how much an instance is likely 
to be chosen as an exemplar. Please note that an exemplar in AP is just like a repre-
sentative instance of a cluster in k-means. The clustering procedure of AP seeks a 
good clustering result that can maximize the fitness function      by passing messag-
es. 
In summary, instead of requiring the number of clusters pre-specified in k-means, 
the preference in AP can affect the number of final clusters because the instance with 
larger preference is more likely to be chosen as an exemplar. 
3.2.2 Discussions on performance 
 
Although AP clustering is more suitable for vertical compression in our model than 
K-means, the time and space complexity of AP is both O(N
2
) while the K-means is  
O(NK) where K is the specified initial number of clusters. That is to say, as running 
AP clustering on one single PC, computing the responsibility and availability matrix 
during iterations will easily run down when N increases, especially for the case that 
each data instance holds many attributes.  
Fig.4 shows the quick performance degeneration of AP clustering on different subsets 
with different number of features selected from KDD99 data aforementioned com-
pared to that of K-means, where the running termination of both algorithms is set to 
obtain the nearly same number of clusters for the sake of convincing comparison.  
Note that the different numbers of selected attributes are resulted from OneR with 20, 
30 and 40 respectively. It can be seen from Fig.4 that, whatever the number of attrib-
utes used for clustering, the computation time cost of K-means is acceptable even if 
the training data items reaches to 10,000, while that of AP is with lower efficiency as 
the number of items increases. In fact, the running of AP is finally halted out of 
memory when the items are larger than 5,000 for the iterative computation on data 
matrix (Note that AP clustering definitely runs out of memory for 6000 training data 
instances in Fig.4.). Therefore, the general PC cannot at all afford the computation 
burden of AP clustering for large training dataset such as KDD99. 
 
Fig.4 Performances of K-means and AP clustering for different volumes of KDD99 training dataset with 
different number of selected attributes running on one PC equipped with AMD Phenom(tm) II N970 Quad-
Core 2.20GHz CPU and 4GB RAM.  
 
To solve this problem, we will propose a distributed and scalable solution for AP 
clustering on large training datasets using MapReduce. MapReduce is a distributed 
and parallel programming framework integrated in Apache Hadoop[49], which at 
current is a well-known popular cloud computing environment for large scale data 
processing. As a sequence, not only efficiency but also scalability for vertical com-
pression conducted on large training data instances are expected when MapReduce is 
employed to parallelize each step of AP clustering. 
3.3 Compression Using MapReduce 
3.3.1 Implementations of Parallelization 
 
A full solution of parallel computing using MapReduce for both horizontal and verti-
cal compression is sketched as in Fig.5. OneR can be directly MapReduced by one-
step, while as the procedure of AP is divided and MapReduced respectively and se-
quentially.  
 
 
Fig.5 The main skeleton of parallelization of model compression using MapReduce 
Based on the work procedure of OneR, the parallelization could be easily realized 
if the error value of each attribute could be calculated on distributed nodes simultane-
ously. Therefore, as shown in Fig.5, we firstly transpose the training data matrix to let 
each row of data matrix denote one values vector of each attribute, which can be tak-
en as partitioned inputs for Map nodes. When each attribute’s error value in OneR is 
parallelly generated by Map tasks on distributed nodes, the final selection of attributes 
can be conducted according to the summarization by one Reduce task. 
Before looking into the parallelization of AP, let us review again the AP algorithm 
into deeper. Besides the similarity s(i,k) defined between data point i and k, responsi-
bility r(i,k) and availability a(i,k) are other two key metrics in AP. The former shows 
the suitability of data point k as the exemplar for data point i after the k competes all 
other point k’, while the later shows the contribution of data point i to select k as its 
exemplar after the i evaluates all other point i’.  
The iterative running steps of AP for N total data points are described as below: 
Step 1. Initialize the responsibility and availability matrix with all r(i,k) and a(i,k) 
being 0. 
Step 2. Compute the similarity matrix s(i,k). 
Step 3. Update the responsibility r(i,k) in term of the following rule: 
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Step 5. Select data point k as clustering exemplar where r(k,k)+a(k,k)>0, and make 
data point k as the exemplar for data point i where s(i,k) is the maximum one. 
Step 6. Terminated if the iteration number exceeds a specific threshold or the exem-
plars are unchanged during a specific number of continued iterations, other-
wise return step 3. 
Observing the above steps of AP, we will then introduce the parallelization method 
for each step using MapReduce. 
 
Parallelization on Similarity Matrix Computation. Euclidean distance is employed 
to compute the similarity under the following formula as for point x and point y with 
totally n attributes: 
2 2 2
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( , ) ( ) 2
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It is obvious that all the three terms for the training data matrix A can be generated 
from the product of the matrix A and its transposed one A
T
, but here we will give a 
more tricky approach using MapReduce. 
Assign A is composed of m instances with each instance having n attributes: 
11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
, ,...,
, ,...,
...
, ,...,
n
n
m m mn
a a a
a a a
A
a a a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The MapReduce procedure to compute the similarity matrix of A is depicted in 
concise as following:  
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As like for OneR, the matrix A is firstly transposed to be A
T
 in which each row is 
actually one vector made up of all values of one attribute. As for Map task, the re-
spective products between each value (we call it key seed) and its backward values in 
each row are generated with assigning the column number of the key seed as Key and 
the product results list as Values. Here all the products between key seed and its for-
ward values in each row are denoted with 0. Then, as for Reduce task, all the corre-
sponding products in each row with the same Key value are combined to be aggrega-
tive addition terms, from which all the similarity items aforementioned can be simul-
taneously computed with ease.  
Parallelization on Responsibility and Availability Computation. Note that if the 
damping parameter λ is fixed, updating r(i,k) is only related to the ith row of both 
availability and similarity matrix while a(i,k) only to kth column of responsibility 
matrix. Hence, during MapReduce the Map task is only simply to assign each ith row 
as the Key value, and then the same ith row (with the Key value equaling i) of data 
point can be eventually shuffled to the same Reduce to update r(i,k) and a(i,k).  
For efficiency purpose, we designed the following structure to present a data point:   
Point 
{  
int x;        //row value of matrix 
int y;        //column value of matrix  
double s; //value of s(x,y)  
double r; //value of r(x,y)  
double a; //value of a(x,y)  
} 
Such a point structure can store the similarity s(x,y), responsibility r(x,y), and avail-
ability a(x,y) of the point with xth row and yth column in training data matrix N(x,y).    
We firstly sequentialize each training data utilizing Point to be as input for MapRe-
duce, then the above mentioned parallel computing procedure can be automatically 
implemented using the Map and Reduce program. Row-based MapReduce implemen-
tation for responsibility parallelization is pictured as Fig.6, while the availability is 
just with the similar process except for doing column-based Map and Reduce. 
 
Fig.6 Parallelization procedure for Responsibility updating in Point using MapReduce 
 
Parallelization on Exemplars Selection. Because a(k,k) and r(k,k) are both included 
in one same Point structure, each Map node can independently compute which data 
points are exemplars. Therefore, computing parallelization for exemplar selection can 
be easily implemented by that Map task generates the corresponding exemplars and 
Reduce task directly combines all exemplars. 
3.3.2 Evaluations on Time Cost and Scalability 
 
As to horizontal compression using parallelization, it can ignore the time cost for 
that it only takes less than one second to compress totally 100,000 instances from 
KDD99 and 128,720 instances from CDMC2012 dataset.  
The time cost for generating the compressed model vertically with AP and k-means 
is described comparably in Fig.7. It can be concluded that model compression may 
take relatively long time, but is considerably improved compared to that from single 
PC as show in Fig.4. In fact, the parallel running time for clustering 6000 training 
data points, even with 40 attributes, using MapReduce with 8 nodes only needs about 
100 seconds. As to CDMC2012 dataset, however, the average time cost using the 
same parallelization platform for compressing model vertically is about 30 seconds.  
  
 
Fig.7 Performances of K-means and AP clustering for different volumes of KDD99 training dataset with 
different number of selected attributes running on 8 nodes of MapReduce clusters with each node equipped 
with AMD Phenom(tm) II N970 Quad-Core 2.20GHz CPU and 4GB RAM.  
 
Not like as single PC could not afford the computation burden of AP clustering for 
larger volume of training data with many attributes, the proposed MapReduce em-
ployed parallelization solution for AP is much more scalable for training data volume. 
As following the performance test results are presented in Fig.8 and Fig.9 respective-
ly. Fig.8 shows the total speedup of computing power for AP-based data compressing 
by augmenting the number of nodes using MapReduce, while Fig.9 shows the specific 
scalability power for handling the increasing volume of training datasets with differ-
ent number of nodes.  We can clearly see that, from Fig.9, when 8 nodes employed in 
MapReduce, the time needed to handle 8,000 sample points is only around 3 times 
than that to 2,000 both for KDD99 and CDMC2012.  
 
Fig.8 Performance of AP clustering for different number of nodes using MapReduce for the given KDD99 
and CDMC2012 dataset(also each node equipped with AMD Phenom(tm) II N970 Quad-Core 2.20GHz 
CPU and 4GB RAM) 
 
 
Fig.9 Performance of AP clustering for different volumes of KDD99 and CDMC2012 training datasets 
using MapReduce with different number of nodes (also each node equipped with AMD Phenom(tm) II 
N970 Quad-Core 2.20GHz CPU and 4GB RAM) 
Also, the figures in the Fig.7 give us a hint that the step of vertical compression can 
be done off-line to meet the requirement in the real-time environment, which applies 
to the horizontal compression as well. To be specific, we just need to provide the 
original training data to the MapReducer responsible for compressing the model, from 
which the generated compact model will be returned to the on-line part for the later 
classification modeling. From Fig.7, we can also observe that the horizontal compres-
sion with OneR can significantly save time on the vertical compression in most cases. 
4. Classification Using Compressed Model  
After the compressed model is built, two traditional classification methods are adopt-
ed in our experiments to evaluate the detection performance of the compressed model, 
namely KNN and SVM. 
KNN (K Nearest Neighbor) is one of the most widely used classification methods 
in data mining. It finds   nearest neighbors of a given instance among all the training 
data. There exist various ways of realizing KNN algorithm, and for the purpose of 
comparing traditional KNN with our improved KNN by utilizing distance matrix, a  
linear scan is employed in our experiments. 
SVM (Support Vector Machine) is one of the recognized machine learning meth-
ods for classification, regression and other learning tasks. Here we would apply C-
SVC (C–Support Vector Classification), one among the SVMs, to identify whether a 
package is abnormal or not. Unlike one-class SVM, which is a frequently used detec-
tion method in intrusion detection using the model built with normal class only, C-
SVC is based on the model with both normal and abnormal instances which is exactly 
applicable for KDD99 and CDMC2012 datasets. 
Since parameters of clustering methods and detection approaches can significantly 
influence the results, here we will explain the way we choose them. 
 
AP. In AP, the only parameter that should be set is the preference. In our experi-
ments, for a comprehensive evaluation, we choose the preferences between the mini-
mum and the maximum of the similarities to generate expected number of clusters 
that are separately distributed. The relationship between the number of exemplars 
generated with AP and the corresponding preference set is described in Table 2. Since 
the number of clusters generated by AP is decided by its preference, it is hardly pos-
sible to generate exactly the wanted number of exemplars. Thus, we endeavor to gen-
erate similar numbers of exemplars for the conditions with and without OneR respec-
tively for a comparison purpose, but not exactly the same. Accordingly, it can be ob-
served from Table 2 that the number of exemplars grows with the increment of the 
preference within expectation. 
Table 2. The relationship between preference and the number of exemplar for KDD99 and CDMC2012 in 
AP 
(a) KDD99 (b) CDMC2012 
 
With OneR Without OneR 
Exemplar Preference Exemplar Preference 
205 -0.0482469 203 -0.4156618 
324 -0.0170783 322 -0.1557253 
480 -0.0072700 471 -0.0672369 
625 -0.0036726 620 -0.0368273 
885 -0.0015379 891 -0.0156519 
1029 -0.0010654 1092 -0.0090514 
1218 -0.0006846 1203 -0.0067543 
1537 -0.0003841 1566 -0.0028883 
2110 -0.0001585 2072 -0.0011145 
3044 -0.0000385 3083 -0.0002925 
4043 -0.0000077 4013 -0.0001038 
 
With OneR Without OneR 
Exemplar Preference Exemplar Preference 
69 -0.4384616 65 -0.8939194 
120 -0.1488941 120 -0.2527850 
212 -0.0434867 216 -0.0729020 
326 -0.0160566 326 -0.0260614 
562 -0.0041900 526 -0.0084119 
689 -0.0023318 682 -0.0040380 
876 -0.0011680 886 -0.0020661 
1215 -0.0003477 1260 -0.0004942 
1618 -0.0001059 1634 -0.0001566 
2056 -0.0000116 2074 -0.0000412 
2512 -0.0000006 2342 -0.0000060 
K-means. Since we use k-means here for the comparison purpose with AP, the pa-
rameter   in the k-means should be set to the same with the number of exemplars 
generated by AP. 
 
KNN. As to KNN, we set the parameter   to be 1, which means that the type for each 
tested instance only depends on its nearest neighbor in the compressed model. Alt-
hough this approach is rather simple, it has shown the high effectiveness practically. 
 
C-SVC. As for C-SVC, since the number of attributes is quite small compared with 
the amount of instances, we choose to deploy a nonlinear kernel, namely Radial Basis 
Function kernel (RBF kernel), to map data to higher dimensional spaces. To better use 
the RBF kernel, one should determine two parameters:   and  . Since the test data are 
unknown in advance, we can only find proper parameters using foregone training data 
with the help of cross-validation. LibSVM [50] provides an automatic implementation 
on grid-searching   and   using cross-validation, through which the best parameters 
for our training data can be concluded as following: for KDD99 dataset, the best 
                       when OneR is deployed while as       
                   without OneR, and for CDMC2012, dataset       = 
                  for both with and without OneR. 
5.  Application on Intrusion Detection 
5.1 Detection Efficiency 
The acceleration of detection is our major contribution in this paper. The test results 
about it are shown in Fig.10 and Fig.11 for both KDD99 and CDMC2012 with regard 
to our horizontal and vertical compression. Please note that baselines in Fig.10 and 
Fig.11, which do not employ the vertical compression but horizontal compression 
may be used, are drawn as well for a comparison purpose. By observing the two 
graphs, we can conclude that: 
a. There is an obvious improvement of speed due to our horizontal compression when 
we compare every blue line with the dashed red line in each graph, where the max-
imal speed-up factor reaches to around 4 in KDD99 with KNN method. 
b. Given horizontal compression, there is furthermore an obvious improvement of 
speed due to our vertical compression when we compare the red horizontal line 
with the red slash lines in each graph, where the maximal speed-up factor reaches 
to around 8 in KDD99 with KNN method. 
c. It is reasonable to see from figures that the smaller amount of clusters (namely 
number of items as shown in these two figures) is, the shorter time it will take for 
detection for both KNN and SVM. One may tend to use smaller number of training 
instances to meet the need of real time if only the detection accuracy can be satis-
fied. But of course, as only if the MapReduce parallelization proposed in section 3 
is employed for model compression, very large number of training instances can 
also be conducted to generate the clusters for detection usage. 
 
                (a) KNN                                                          (b) SVM 
Fig.10 Comparative results of detection time with KNN and SVM respectively for KDD99 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2900
3000
 
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
)
Number of items
  Without OneR
  With OneR
  KNN (AP)
  KNN (K-means)
  KNN (Base)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
 
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
)
Number of items
  Without OneR
  With OneR
  SVM (AP)
  SVM (K-means)
  SVM (Base)
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Fig.11 Comparative results of detection time with KNN and SVM respectively for CDMC2012 
Specifically, if we consider the blue baseline without any compression and the red 
resulting record with our full compressed model, the speedup ratio can reach to 
around 132 times (172.363 versus 1.3) for CDMC2012 and almost 184 times 
(2907.775 versus 15.718) for KDD99 when the simple KNN is directly used as the 
detection method. 
5.2 Detection Accuracy 
Although the resulting efficiency that has been empirically proved as aforementioned 
is our major focus in this paper, the detection accuracy is another important factor for 
a real-world detection application. However, we will concentrate on the difference of 
detection accuracy (with and without the compressed model) instead of the direct 
detection accuracy, because our compressed model is not proposed to contribute to 
the accuracy improvement, and the detection methods which are related to the direct 
detection accuracy are still the common ones. We would like to survey the difference 
with two standard measures here, namely recall and false positive rate. Recall is the 
ratio between the number of correctly detected anomalies and the total number of 
anomalies. False positive rate is the ratio between the number of data records from 
normal class that are misclassified as anomalies and the total number of data records 
from normal class. Table 3 and Table 4 record the recall and the false positive rate 
(not the relative difference) respectively for KDD99, and results of CDMC2012 are 
shown in Table 5 and Table 6. The last row of each table below is the benchmark 
without vertical compression(8,000 and 5,000 instances are selected from KDD99 and 
CDMC2012 respectively for experimental purpose). 
Table 3. Recall with and without horizontal compression for KDD99 
(a) With horizontal compression (b) Without horizontal compression 
R 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
205 98.6538 98.9963 97.1988 97.2399 
324 98.0899 99.1644 97.2186 97.1364 
R 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
203 99.4422 99.3577 97.5557 97.5329 
322 99.5487 99.4513 97.9530 97.5291 
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  With OneR
  SVM (AP)
  SVM (K-means)
  SVM (Base)
 480 98.5229 99.2246 97.2194 97.1600 
625 98.8182 99.1226 97.2148 97.1783 
885 99.0708 99.0237 97.2109 97.1631 
1029 98.8250 99.2344 97.1905 97.1783 
1218 98.9400 99.2786 97.1889 97.1958 
1537 99.1515 99.4003 97.1912 97.1943 
2110 98.9970 99.4551 97.1927 97.1927 
3044 99.3730 99.4909 97.1904 97.1889 
4043 99.3577 99.5099 97.1889 97.1882 
8000 99.5738 97.2255 
 
471 99.6157 99.4331 97.5702 97.5420 
620 99.6355 99.6872 98.9635 98.6645 
891 99.6545 99.6850 98.2315 99.2558 
1092 99.7085 99.6796 99.0160 99.0648 
1203 99.7192 99.6926 99.1089 99.1972 
1566 99.7177 99.7260 99.1850 99.1819 
2072 99.7162 99.7245 99.2550 99.2421 
3083 99.7177 99.7238 99.2306 99.2459 
4013 99.7184 99.7207 99.2558 99.2383 
8000 99.7215 99.2436 
Table 4. False positive rate with and without horizontal compression for KDD99 
 
Table 5. Recall with and without horizontal compression for CDMC2012 
(a) With horizontal compression (b) Without horizontal compression 
 
R 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
69 97.1653 95.2388 97.9342 93.2254 
120 96.7909 95.8339 97.0098 93.4226 
212 96.2301 96.9319 96.9320 94.3126 
326 95.9425 96.0365 95.0868 93.4243 
562 95.6024 89.9765 94.2782 93.8766 
689 95.6458 90.1013 94.3886 93.9074 
876 95.8755 90.2768 94.4935 93.9707 
1215 95.9280 77.8365 94.7739 94.0503 
1618 95.9443 78.5709 94.7395 94.3614 
2056 95.8430 62.8817 94.7467 94.3813 
2512 95.8068 64.4736 94.5279 94.3849 
5000 96.0980 94.3126 
 
R 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
65 95.7145 95.3075 96.5955 94.6834 
120 95.7308 78.0481 97.0785 87.6411 
216 94.9855 79.8101 95.8412 90.6983 
326 95.0054 78.9110 94.3343 93.9743 
526 94.9602 79.1842 94.5333 94.2873 
682 95.0217 76.0836 94.8860 94.7902 
886 95.1954 87.6972 94.8444 94.8318 
1260 95.1592 90.2840 94.9367 94.7684 
1634 95.1592 88.6849 95.0000 94.8082 
2074 95.1429 62.7985 95.6078 94.9331 
2342 95.0742 62.8636 95.1302 94.9729 
5000 95.4016 96.5955 
Table 6. False positive rate with and without horizontal compression for CDMC2012 
(a) With horizontal compression (b) Without horizontal compression 
FPR 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
69 2.1786 2.1581 2.3042 2.2881 
120 2.2735 2.0894 2.3042 2.2808 
212 2.1815 2.0617 2.3042 2.2589 
326 2.0967 2.0295 2.2881 2.1800 
562 1.9798 1.7928 2.2750 2.2443 
689 1.9842 1.8162 2.2750 2.2443 
FPR 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
65 1.1338 1.1163 2.2560 2.1625 
120 1.1455 0.7715 2.3042 1.9740 
216 1.1163 0.8358 2.2911 1.9959 
326 1.1178 0.0801 2.2677 2.1376 
526 1.1192 0.8022 2.2662 2.2691 
682 1.1222 0.7905 2.2691 2.2721 
(a) With horizontal compression (b) Without horizontal compression 
FPR 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
205 0.2699 0.7509 0.0196 0.0273 
324 0.1857 0.5932 0.0219 0.0125 
480 0.3138 0.6780 0.0225 0.0136 
625 0.3073 0.5131 0.0225 0.0136 
885 0.3779 0.4561 0.0225 0.0142 
1029 0.2746 0.4146 0.0214 0.0196 
1218 0.2533 0.3553 0.0219 0.0237 
1537 0.3345 0.3262 0.0219 0.0231 
2110 0.2906 0.4217 0.0225 0.0231 
3044 0.2841 0.4336 0.0243 0.0255 
4043 0.3001 0.4288 0.0255 0.0249 
8000 0.3565 0.0326 
 
FPR 
Num 
KNN SVM 
AP K-means AP K-means 
203 0.0552 0.0908 0.0338 0.0486 
322 0.0374 0.0634 0.0279 0.0522 
471 0.0996 0.1453 0.0285 0.0344 
620 0.1311 0.2118 0.0409 0.0303 
891 0.0919 0.2776 0.0350 0.0611 
1092 0.0913 0.2052 0.0480 0.0469 
1203 0.0747 0.2058 0.0623 0.0694 
1566 0.0629 0.1975 0.0712 0.0706 
2072 0.0581 0.1548 0.0605 0.0730 
3083 0.0581 0.1530 0.0700 0.0694 
4013 0.0581 0.0996 0.0706 0.0736 
8000 0.0991 0.0937 
 
 876 1.9258 1.7840 2.2443 2.2443 
1215 1.9535 1.5079 2.2794 2.2443 
1618 1.8907 1.5108 2.2487 2.2443 
2056 1.8717 1.2946 2.2443 2.2443 
2512 1.8498 1.3004 2.2443 2.2443 
5000 1.8279 2.2443 
 
886 1.1178 1.0243 2.2735 2.2428 
1260 1.1178 1.0491 2.2428 2.2428 
1634 1.1178 1.0184 2.2443 2.2428 
2074 1.1178 0.5611 2.2458 2.2443 
2342 1.1002 0.5625 2.2443 2.2443 
5000 1.0929 2.2531 
  
According to these tables, we can find that both of two measures (recall and false 
positive rate) from the k-means have a larger difference with that of the benchmark 
compared to the ones resulting from the affinity propagation (averaged at less than 
1% for all the cases) which is actually the cornerstone of our work. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
We have proposed a compressed model for intrusion detection, including horizontal 
compression and vertical compression on training data. To be specific, the first en-
deavor in this paper is to horizontally select useful attributes of the training data 
through efficient method of OneR, and then vertically extract the representative data 
as exemplars from a larger dataset through the novel clustering method of AP. Based 
on the compressed model on training dataset, we finally studied KNN and SVM as 
two detection methods and empirically identified all parameters of AP for model 
compression and SVM for classification. Comprehensive experiments on intrusion 
detection datasets have been conducted to demonstrate the high performance resulting 
from the compressed model we proposed. In the best case, it runs 184 times faster 
than the traditional one without our model compression, and neither the recall (detec-
tion rate) nor the false positive rate sacrifices only in a very small range with less than 
1% on average which can be tolerable or ignorable compared to the big efficiency 
improvement. Another important contribution is that we have implemented a MapRe-
duce based parallelization framework for each step of the model compression proce-
dure. Actually, we have made efforts to improve both the performance and scalability 
of compression on large volume of training data by MapReduce-based parallelization. 
Experimental analysis have been conducted to show that our model compression 
framework can handle more than 10,000 data points in minutes using 8 commodity 
PC nodes, while the memory of one general PC can only process not exceeding 5,000 
instances using AP clustering.  
The main merits of our works on intrusion detection are twofold. One is to initially 
introduce a compressed model of training data space for efficient intrusion detection 
which focuses on both efficiency and accuracy. The other is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first effort of MapReduce based implementation to do the parallel and 
scalable compression on large amount of training data. However, there are also two 
open problems left to be solved in our approach, the ability of incremental compres-
sion processing and the performance refinement of MapReduce-based parallel compu-
ting framework.  
As the future work, we will further develop our approach in two ways. One is to 
explore the study on incremental clustering ability of AP[51], as in order to efficiently 
handle the incremental clustering on network intrusion training data. Another, im-
provement on the performance of MapReduce based parallel computing is a long-term 
goal, especially to study on the iteration mechanism employing some latest parallel-
ization frameworks such as SPARK[52]. We hope our methodology proposed in this 
paper can finally be served as a general reference model to meet kinds of security 
mining challenge from big data systems rather than intrusion detection[53]. 
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